4/17/81 I. Introduction Public enterprise finance, broadly defined, encomipasses mechanisms for raising funds, distributing profits, and absorbing losses. While these functions are shared with private finance, public enterprise finance typically differs in one important respect. When private firms raise capital on a commerical basis, they incur explicit obligations to repay specific amounts or T;hares of their profits in the future. These obligations reflect the opportunity cost of funds for claims of similar riskiness. Thus, in raising funds, they also specify the distribution of future profits and losses.
In contrast, when public enterprises (PEs) raise funds, they often do so without incurring such explicit obligations. Even when PEs borrow from commerical sources, they often do so with govrnmental guarantees, implicit or otherwise.
As a result, PEs incur explicit financinq costs that do not reflect the private opportunity cost of funds employed in th:, enterprises, let alone their social opportunity costs.
In this paper we argue that the typical pattern of PE finance yields a distorted picture of the opportunity cost of funds employed and, hence, of the profitability and efficiency of public enterpriese.. While thi:s should have no real effect in an idealized setting where all PE decisions are madet in light of the full set of social costs and benefits -including the social opportunity cost of funds employed -we believe that in practice the way PEs are financed often contributes to inappropriate investment and operating decisions. In our view, the primary link between financing and a PE's strategic and operating decisions is the structure of management incentives.
Although the social opportunity cost of funds employed in a PE depends on their use
and not on how they are labeled, the explicit cost of these funds does depend on how the PE is financed. This explicit financial cost -reflecting the nature of the financial obligations incurred by the PE when it raises funds -is an important factor in its financial profitability and capacity to (q?rnerate cash flows.
there is a schedule of opportunity costs of furlin, dl(.pending on the social risk of the activities in which they are employed. Whil,. th,. social opportunity cost of funds utilized in a PE is independent of the ,;,v, it is financed, unless foreign financed is employed, the fact that this cost vLi across uses increases the likelihood that the explicit pricing of finance mayl not provide appropriate signals to PE managers regarding the use of :;ocial resource:;, arid may therefore lead to particular biases in decision-making.
In this section, following a brief discussion of the concept of the social opportunity cost of capital (SOCK) we describe the implications of investment risk, financial structure, and foreign financing for this cost.
The Concept: The social opportunity cost of capital reflects the total rate of return foregone by society when funds are drawn from capital markets and applied to a particular project. In one widely used formulation of this concept introduced
by Harberger (1976) , this cost is, in a closed economy, equal to the required rate of return in the capital market lus a figure reflecting net foregone tax revenues from investments displaced and savings induced by the increase in this required return resulting from the additioInal demand for ca! ital. In a partially open economy, a fraction of the additional fnds raised are drawn from displaced investment, but to the extent that the country faced an upward sloping supply schedule of foreign capital because of the cost of investment and compliance associated with cross-border financing, the social opportunity cost becomes a weighted average of the domestic market rate adjusted for displaced taxes and the marginal cost of foreign borrowing.
An important implication of this definition of the discount rate is as follows:
consider a project that has an after-tax private net present value (NPV) of zero and also pays average taxes per unit of capital empcloyed, as well as making a contribution to the country's access to foreign financin(g. Such a project will have a social NPV, including tax payments, of zero if it -creates no other net externalities.
Thus, it is appropriate only for a PE that pays normal taxes per unit of capital employed, to judge new ventures by discountirln t net-of-tax cash flows at the appropriate private market rate or gross-of-tax flow:; at the appropriate social rate.
Risk and the Social'Opportunity Cost.of Capital.
In the social cost-benefit literature, the SOCK is typically characterized as; a single rate for an entire economy. However, it is now generally accel)ted thlat the return in the private market is dependent on the risk of the activity Lbing financed.
There are compelling reasons for believing the same is true for the social rate.
The rationale -r a schedule of opportunity costs that depends on risk is that individuals (and society, as their collective agent) are risk averse and, c()lsequently, demand a premium in the form of a higher expected return for bearing risk. However, since they can diversify their claims against risky ventures, in equilibrium only those risks which cannot be averaged out in the total market or social portfolio will command a premium. The resulting relationship between systematic risk and expected rate of return required by private investors is shown in figure Ia below.
As noted above, the social opportunity cost exceeds the private oortunit: .te by an adjustment for financial externalities, and it is likely that this adjuistment increases with the risk of the activity. The resulting schedule of social opportunity costs of capital is depicted in Figure Ib . This schedule applies to specific projects undertaken by a PE rather than to the PE as a whole. Tn other words, a public enterprise has no cost of capital, only its individual undertakings have a cost of capital.
The view that the social opportunity cost of capital for a PE (or for a specific undertaking of a PE) may include isk premium deserves some comment, as it is 3 contrary to much of received wisIf risks facing PE investment are fully Source: Baldwin, Lessard, and Mason [1981] where RRR RP R SOCK IT private market required rate of return risk premium interest rate on riskless debt social opportunity cost of capital tax adjustment reflecting proportion of funds drawn from domestic investment and tax proceeds from "normal" domestic investment RRR j I ill diversifiable within the economy, no risk premii;rn ;tould be charged. However, for many LDCs, PE investment involves significant i(nridivcrsifiable risk. That is, the impact of a particular PE investment on the vriral),iity of national income cannot be totally offset by counteracting risks of otli r activities in the country. If this is the case, capital market theory holds.that r) :;uc:h investments a risk premium should be charged in addition to the basic irtl-,rt rate.
This risk premium will be small only if, as i some LDCs, the sector of the economy facing the same risks as those facing the PE is small, and if the risks to which it is exposed are not common to significant ;sectors of the economy, a situation In the case of copper mining, for example, Lessard (1977) found that within the major producing countries' economies, a much smaller fraction of the. risk associated with copper production was diversifiable than within the world economy. 
III. Patterns of Public Enterprise Finance
In this section, we briefly characterizet xi ;ti£ju patterns of PE finance. Our primary interest is in determining the "pricinq" of capital implicit in the terms on which it is provided to the PE. Finance canr be broken down into broad types depending on the type of repayment obligation involved:
(1) Credit, where the expected cost (return to the lender) is equal to the promised interest rate less the anticipated default losses,
Risk capital, where the expected cost (return to the investor) is a specified share of future expected profits, and (3) Subsidy capital, where no future financial obligation is incurred. To the extent that the expected cost of credit or risk capital is less than the market rate, the resulting finance is actually a combination of one of these forms of commercial financing and subsidy capital.
Although PEs vary substantially across coiJntries, and even within countries, we believe that certain generalizations are po,-.:ible. The generalizations reported below are drawn both from our experience in 8.v, ral countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka) and from secondary sources.
While some of our observations may be disputel, they represent out best effort to summarize the scanty evidence on this topic. EWl hope they will be received in that same spirit.
The discussion is organized around three headigs:
(1) sources of finance, Owing to both influences noted above, PEs are typically highly levered relative to comparable private firms. The degree of leveriage often exceeds the commercial debt capacity of the enterprises. For private enterprises, the x-erational consequences of high leverage are well known. Except where lending irn--itutions enjoy extraordinarily close relationships with borrowing enterprises, as in Japan and, to some extent, Korea (where debt-equity ratios of 5:1 and higher are not uncommon)
high leverage materially increases a firm's vulnerability to fluctuations in business conditions, and therefore involves greater ri.k f bankruptcy. High leverage in PEs also matters, but given the reluctance of parent. governments to allow PEs to go out of business, bankruptcy risks are not the reason. Rather, as we point out in Section IV, high leverage becomes a significant problem for PEs because of its implications both for incentives facing managers and for th(-disposition of enterprise surpluses.
Direct Government Finance: PEs commonly rcctie irect subventions from the public treasury. These subventions take a vtri.t-y of forms, including injections of true risk capital (equity), direct loans fr(rr, thei budget, subventions labeled as equity participation (but which in actualit r rt:;ent write-offs of direct loans or government assumption of enterprise doLt with third parties), explicit or implicit operating subsidies, and other, ls; obvious methods of transfer.
In most LDCs with large PE sectors, governmrnt.; have displayed considerable reluctance to furnish their progeny with true risk capital,where the expected repayment is sufficient to compensate for the risk involved of the type discussed earlier in this section. This reluctance is due to a variety of factors, but four in particular seem to stand out from experience across countries.
First, there is a pervasive tendency in LDCs, to equate finance with credit, and to assume that any project that is worthwhile can lbe financed with credit. Second, governments that must continually cope with fiscal "tightness" in the form of shortfalls of tax collections relative to expenditure:; (a category that includes most LDCs save major oil exporters) often find it e-iier, both politically and procedurally, to channel direct loans rather than equity finance to PEs, since equity injections are ordinarily classed as government expenditure, while direct loans often escape this label, wholly or partially. Third, government aencies seeking to maintain control over enterprise activities often prefer loans over equity transfers as a way of keeping firms more closely beholden to the qranting agency,since loans carry explicit repayment obligations.
Finally, the nature of many multilateral foreign aid programs predisposes governments to emphasize direct loans over equity trans;Ltrs to PEs. Since 1967, much of multilateral project aid (as from, for example, the World Bank) has been channeled to activities undertaken by PEs. This has been ,i.rticularly true for Colombia, Indonesia, Bolivia, ald Bangladesh (Gillis, 1981) . Under such aid programs, the donor extends the loans to the parent government, which then transfers the funds to PEs in the form of credit which bears specific terms as to interest rate and repayment period. In some cases, as in Indonesia ad Bolivian railways, Indonesian agricultural estates and fertilizer enterprises, and Colombian development finance institutions, government loans of this type havy in some periods accounted for the majority of PE debt obligations.
Preferences and pressures for loan finance notwithstanding, government equity participation in PEs has not been unimportant in all countries. Indeed, this method of' finance has become increasingly more common in major oil exporting LDCs since 1974 -1975 (Trebat, 1980 While governments may prefer debt to aquit/ iinaic·:e for PEs, the opposite is normally true for PE managers, who tend to view c4i ty as having no cost to the firm. This perception is reinforced by the f,'ti 1 lir-cof governments to "price" equity, either in the form of shadow prices communicated to PE managers, or in the form of specific dividend obligations (see below).
Reinvested Cash Flows from Operations: 'l, i:; ';ource of finance has at times been significant in several countries, including K;r ( .t froml 1961 ( .t froml -1972 ( .t froml (Jones, 1975 Brazil in 1966 -1975 (Trebat, 1980 ; Uruguay in L' 75-19'76, India in 1970 -1972 , Taiwan from 1960 -1974 , and Sri Lanka (Gillis, 1981 . In all of these countries, the PE sector generated more than 10% of total national :avings in the periods cited.
Reliance on reinvested cash flows has perha'; b:cn most striking in Brazil. Over the period 1966-1975, a group of 40-odd of the larguest PEs surveyed by Trebat were able to internally finance from 40 to 60 percent of their gross investment, a share of internal finance that just about matches that for private Brazilian firms (Trebat, 1980) . The share of internal finance in Korean [PEs, while relatively high when compared with most LDCs, was apparently much lw:r than in Brazil. Jones reports that over the period 1961-1972, the PE sector generated slightly more than 10% of national savings, while absorbing something lik. 30' of investment. (Jones, 1975) . and Somalia, Jamaica, and Colombia (all with relatlively small PE sectors). In all of these nations, the savings of PEs accounted for less than 5% of total investment finance over the period 1970 -1973 (Gillis, 1981 Channeling of earmarked government taxes to Oi:s is fairly common, and has been particularly important in Colombia, Ghana, and razil. In the latter country, earmarked taxes accounted for fully 12% of PE investment finance in 1974 -1975 (Trebat, 1980 .
RULES FOR EXTRACTING AND DISTRIBUTING PROFITS:
In developed countries, managers of widely-held private sector firms face conflictinr incentives both for under-reporting and for full reporting of pre-tax profits. Even when taxed, PEs often face lower effective tx rat,~s than private firms because of the high proportion of thier investment financ(l by debt, since interest payments are almost everywhere allowed as a tax deduction.
RULES FOR ABSORBING LOSSES:
Higl leverage in Pi~' increases the prospect that cash flows of the firm will fall short of meeting oiperating and investment requirements.
As a result, the sponsoring government often mu.st intervene in the form of providing additional funds either through direct subsidtic:;, rlling-over of debt, guaranteeing additional external debt, or related methods. Such bail-outs are typically ad hoc in nature, with governments assuming PE bank dtbt, or conversion of these claim to PE "equity". In many cases, this recapitalization of P'Es does not result in an exchange of future financial obligations for 'il. current ones, but merely "wipes the slate clean".
In summary, we can caricature the above financial linkages, rules for the distribution of profits, and rules for covering lo.,, ;:; follows: public enterprises have access to many sources of finance for wlichl *:xplicit costs are artificially low relative to their social costs. After the fact, if operations result in substantial surpluses the public enterprise is often al)1e to retain control over virtually all of these flows. In contrast, if the "profitLs" of the public enterprise are insufficient to meet the formal commitments associated with the initial financing terms, the government, in one fashion or anothe!r, will typically assume its liabilities. Of course, in this latter case, the government may intervene in the enterprise and penalize its managers, possibly even by dismissing them, as in several cases in Indonesian oil and banking PEs. However, even tis link may be broken if the PE can gain access to additional financing by arguing tl]t the losses were due to factors beyond its control, and that it has met its mis;iJorn in supplying or in meeting the multiple social objectives thrust upon it.
IV. IMPACT OF FINANCING PATTERNS OF PE DECISIONS
Behavioral Assumptions.
There is no generally accepted theory of how PE managers react to changes in the variables which can be altered by the financial structure of the organization. However, the pattern and outcomes of the financial linkages described above suggest that they both influence and are influenced by managerial motives within PEs. This possibility has; slli I lhcr recognized in the economic literature dealing with the evaluation of public sector projects.
When differences between the information aldi objective sets of managers and the state are taken into account, the role of finalice in PE decisionmaking becomes much more like the role of finance in private erlt:r[rises.
In the case of private enterprises, financial structure matters primarily because it affects enterprise vulnerability to bankruptcy and because it alter:; te distribution of profits going to shareholders (and other private financial claimants) and to the government through taxes.
In the case of PEs, financial structure, and the return required by the state on different types of financing that it extends to the PE will alter the distribution between the surpluses returned directly to the state and those controlled by the PE and hence relevant to the PE manager.
Two views of PE managers which are examined here might be characterized as a) the broadly rational maximizer of net social benefits and b) the narrowly rational seeker of autonomy and stability. The Seeker of Autonomy and Stability: Some analysts, Aharoni (1979 Aharoni ( , 1980 , Maniatis (1968) have outlined an alternative rival objective function, one in which a major goal of the PE manager is that of maintaiing independence vis-a-vis the government in order to assure continuity and st a}ility of both employment and public service programs (cf. Bolivia, Colombia, Indonc;it., thana, most of Europe, Sri Lanka).
That is, managers seek to avoid the need to appeal to the government for handouts ill or for new equity to cover lo:;se:; or new invw:;t.,;l.rit:;, as this invites unwanted and often troublesome scrutiny or intervention. The impact of alternative financing arrangements on enterprise autonomy, indepeidle.il, and stability will therefore be of central concern to PE managers.
In financial terms,' this desire for autonormy implies that managers will strongly seek to maintain positive cash flows. It may a;o Lead such managers to accept more risks than the broadly rational maximizer otf ;,ocial. benefits, as acceptance of more risks may increase the likelihood of sustained organization growth and autonomy.
This notion stands in sharp contrast to a view of public enterprise finance that might arise from purely economic considerationi; assuminq idealized information and coordination within the public sector.
We note various implications of assuming that PE managers are narrowly rational
below.
Implications for PE Management.
Capital Intensity: To the extent that the( xplicit cost of funds is understated relative to their social opportunity costs or treated as zero, narrowly rational PE managers will tend to overinvest in capital in order to reduce recurring expenditures that will have to be covered by future operatinrg revenues or government appropriations (Jenkins 1980) . This effect will be exaggerated when PE's access to credit is conditional on the purc:has,, of (foreign-sourced) capital goods, In contrast, in more entrepreneurial. P:-;, :mBirJ,-i(r.; may perceive relatively few penalties for economic losses as long as they(; crt irl(0 to satisfy politically important constituencies by providing desired :;rv.ices and, perhaps more importantly, these penalties may not increase proportionately with the magnitude of the loss.
These same managers may perceive substantial benefit:3 from economic success, since it will increase organizational autonomy, enhanco the changes of satisfying politically relevant constituencies, as well as provide the psychological and material rewards of a growing empire. The near catastrophic recent history of Pertamina in Indonesia, the state economic development corporations in Malaysia, and the present development of Petrocan in Canada ilu:;t-.raltc this type of behavior.
For any business organization there is some (; xplicit or implicit mechanism whereby the returns to thb enterprise are tran;formed into returns which are relevant for determining managerial rewards or puniLhments.
In Figure 2 we illustratthe case of an owner managed enterprise activ.ity where the relevant return for the management's success or failure rating is identical to that of the firm. Therefore, given a return of R for the firm, the manaqeria.lly relevant return (not necessarily his own personal incomne) is also R. In this case the entire set of returns to the enterprise, when transformed ito te returns relevant for managers, falls along the 45 degree line OC. 
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view as yielding positive benefits to them. T'lh[;se include financial gains, working environment, status, future job security, and power.
However, these managerial relevant returns art . likely to be a complex function of the resources which remain in the co: nand of the enterprise. However, for an enterprise rate of return below L or above H (e.g., B and K, respectively), the relevant managerial rates of rturn (Bm and K ) are less than the enterprise returns ,-. e, .
-..I ;.-; would strive to obtain a return within the normal r-.nQ . > ;) .;hcre their relative "rewards" would be greatest.
Conversely, they would avoid risky projcpts '.'t!t t·c prospect of yielding high and low enterprise returns which woulId in turn lead to managerially lower rates of return relative to those of tl, nter'rrise.
This mapping of enterprise returns 2.e-s not mean that the public enterprise manager is any more or less r;k .. e as anl individual than are private sector managers. The transfor:-.: i ::. bittween these two returns depends on the financial environment in t;hicr, tey work.
The financial environment in turn will be an important cor-oicnt of the incentive system facing the management. A key determi:.ant of this environment is the financial structure of the enterprise an.: the financial commitments undertaken in order to obtain this financing. n contrast, Figure 4 illustrates the case of the entrepreneurial t:'blic enterprise where the manager is not penalized as much for abnormally low rates of return as the private enterprist (below L) but rewarrŽ!-mere than normal for high rates of return (above HI). In this case the financing arrangements and the institutional control of tht enterpri::,,-ar, such as to make the prospect of rates of return ithin the nora]i rnc-of L to H less attractive to the managers of the public e-nt2rri se than to their private sector counterparts. Hence, an incentive is created which will cause managers of PEs to want to undertake ure risky projects. It is important to note that it is not the basic attitude of the PE manager toward risk which is different. Rather it is the financial structure and ultimately the incentive structure which is different in these two cases.
In the existing literature on private and public sector managerial behavior the emphasis has often been on the resence or absence of risk aversion for tse groups w thout rakinq a clear distinction between the determinants of the "anaqrially relevant" payoffs as illustrated by
Figures 2 to 4 and te risk tolerance of the individuals. It is likely that the differences in perceived payoffs will swamp differences in managerial risk tolerance. The particular financing arrangements provided the public enterprise will in turn play a major role in determining the managerially relevant returns for the various returns generated by the enterprise.
Fi. by the central treasury. In contrast, when public nterprises are thrust into ventures whose market structures, cost situations, or service requirements lead them to be unprofitable, they will try to reduce their public service load (social obligation) in order to obtain that level of profitability which allows them stability and independence.
IV. ISSUES FOR FUITIHERP RESEARCH
Development of an operational framework to llua[yze the role which financing plays in public enterprise activities requires in unrderstanding of the way in which particular financial arrangements for public ntr.rpr-iscs alter the incentives faced by managers and controllers.
Coupled with a more xplicit nmethodolo(y for ImfJ;iuring the opportunity costs of funds committed to PEs, this should suggc.:t wvs for incorporating these costs into the decision-making process of PEs. In turn, this may mean that non-conventional financial instruments will be needed to tb( designed so that both PE managers and governments will have an incentive to mininri-t, the distortions created by financial illusion. Please note throughout that we use t.h1 tms "opportunity cost of capital," "cost of capital," and "required Fite of return" interchangeably. ___ There is an IBM book about the "vertical society" called Chi'e Nahane. It compares Japanese and Chinese family systems which are really quite different.
He gave us a copy of it. He also gave us a copy of another book, both of which were in Japanese. The reverse opinion of Japanese society saying that others are very similar to Japan, how Japan incorporated. It virtually disputes everything that everyone always accepts about Japan. He says that lifetime employment is not true. In this book it says that it began around 1950 so it is only 30 years old and he thinks it hasn't been tested adequately yet. Corporations obviously are going to find it increasingly expensive because if you look at a graph of employment, there is a big bulge in the 35 to 40 age range. When they come to retirement age, the companies aren't going to be able to afford the services and pension plans to them that they are talking about. The book says all of that is "an illusion." There will be a ceiling hit. He gave the example of the second oil shock in 1974-75 when Hitoshi, for example, laid people off, supposedly an unheard of thing. Some of the people were brought back but they did in fact lose seniority for the time they missed. We asked him if he found this opposition point of view in a book to be convincing and h said, "not quite." tape 2 2 medical doctors and also landowners who had devices to hide their income.
He felt that military expenditures in Japan were somewhat higher than were reported because many of the construction projects of the Department of Construction were really motivated for military purposes such as a security highway and communication system. However, the LDP is committed to keeping the military budget low so that the only way in which they can increase it substantially is through hiding it in this way.
There are three national medical insurance systems, one is a government system for seniors and unemployed people. It is always in the red. The second is the private corporations. He feels they are very wealthy and have to invest their surplus funds so they hide their assets in land purchases, thus raising the cost of land again. And finally there is a cooperative system consisting of groups from small companies.
He does feel that the changing age profile of the population will impact on the savings rate. Now the high level of savings is required by the absence of adequate social security.
Are there pressures to change the savings rate? Apparently the average savings here is about 20%. No, not really, because social security is decreasing in a percentage of expenses that it will cover so individuals are going to have to take care of themselves and apparently they know that. At this point, over the age of 70 medical services are free; as the average age of the population increases they don't know whether they will be able to maintain that. The common practice here is for savings to take place in the post office which apparently was the case in the United States a number of years ago. That continues to be the case. Their post office, just as a side point, is becoming fully automated.
They have all kinds of exotic systems now that we don't use yet and is extremely efficient post office system. For example, just for your interest, it only took six days for your letter to get here. recently Japan has been importing raw materials, adding value via manufacture and then exporting. This is now changing inasmuch as most of these manufactured goods are produced in the newly industrializing countries. Hence Japan is loosing the manufacturing capacity and Japan is beginning to export design, technical skills and intelligent machines. The implication of this is that Japan will develop what he called cultured industries and he made special reference to the fashion business and personal skills. ("Kenzo") Japan is now paying roughly 50% of its income for "miscellaneous," that is, services. The number of houses is now greater than the number of families but they tend to be of low quality and small.
Japan essentially now has two classes of people, those who own land and those who do not. The former group is in a position to get credit from banks and to profit from inflationary situations: the others are not. He agreed that wealth and income distribution was relatively even in Japan in that salary differentials tended to be relatively small. However he felt that the total income distribution was less equal than would be indicated by salary differentials and that there is a high rate of unreported income by certain groups, specifically
